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Abstract
#is paper is about how the severity of criminal punishment is often based 
on the resultant luck of the criminal. For example, a failed attempt at murder 
is punished with a lesser sentence than a successful attempt. Primarily, this 
paper dives into the various scholarly opinions regarding the role that “moral 
luck” plays in criminal sentencing. Moral luck essentially refers to the fact 
that society often makes moral judgments of people based on how a crime 
turns out, and not on the nature of the criminal attempt itself.
Moral Luck
One of the most controversial debates among philosophers has revolved 
around whether or not it is justi$able that our criminal justice system pun-
ishes failed criminal attempts less severely than successful criminal attempts. 
One of the reasons that this aspect of our legal system is so controversial 
is because many philosophers have insisted that the success or failure of a 
criminal action depends on factors that are beyond the criminal’s control. 
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While our criminal justice system is commonly thought of as a re&ection of 
humanity’s moral values, it is reasonable to infer that humanity has a tendency 
to morally judge people on how their actions turn out. If one agrees with 
the position that criminals are not in control of the harm that they cause, 
it is reasonable to conclude that whether or not a criminal will be morally 
judged as good or bad is a matter of luck. Another controversial debate has 
revolved around whether or not a criminal who in&icts harm upon his victim 
is more morally blameworthy than a criminal fails to cause harm. #ese two 
controversial debates surrounding the punishment of criminal attempts have 
provided a wide range of philosophical arguments.
#omas Nagel’s “Moral Luck” is an essay that presents a platform for 
a bevy of philosophical arguments regarding the di"erential punishment 
of successful and failed criminal attempts. #e purpose of this essay is to 
compare and contrast the opinions of $ve authors who have di"ering beliefs 
on punishment. Barbara Herman’s “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts” 
and Michael S. Moore’s “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness” aim to 
justify our unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts. Sanford H. 
Kadish’s “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw” and Joel Feinberg’s 
“Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts” aim to show that our legal sys-
tem needs to be re-evaluated. David Lewis’ “#e Punishment that Leaves 
Something to Chance” aims to rationalize our current system of punishment, 
although Lewis admits that he is unsure if his rationalization is justi$able. 
Before I analyze what these $ve authors have to say, it is necessary to lay out 
the basis of #omas Nagel’s controversial argument.
#omas Nagel suggests that Immanuel Kant’s philosophy regarding luck’s 
relationship to morality, which is that “good or bad luck should in&uence nei-
ther our moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment 
of himself,” is often contrary to how society forms moral judgments.1 Nagel 
observes that although the success or failure of our actions often depends 
on many factors that are beyond our control, our actions are nevertheless 
preceded by a societal and self-re&ective moral judgment that assesses our 
goodness or badness as people. Since much of what we do depends on 
factors that we have no control over, and we make moral judgments about 
1  Nagel, #omas. “Moral Luck.” Philosophy of Law. By Joel Feinberg, Jules L. Coleman, and 
Christopher Kutz. 9th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2014), 750. 
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people anyway, “moral luck” can be described as the good or bad luck that 
comes from these uncontrollable factors and their e"ect on the subsequent 
assessment of our moral standing. While highlighting four kinds of moral 
luck, and simultaneously suggesting that we do not have control over our 
luck, Nagel’s essay examines the paradoxical nature of moral luck and the 
dilemma it causes when trying to hold someone morally responsible for 
their actions.
Nagel insists that “what we do is limited by the opportunities and choices 
with which we are faced, and these are largely determined by factors beyond 
our control.”2 #e absence of control that is inherent in our actions seems to 
make it impossible for us to hold anyone morally responsible for what they 
do. However, Nagel states that the condition of control cannot be ignored 
because it is simply a natural consequence of moral assessment. When we 
consider that one of the conditions of moral assessment involves observing 
the lack of control humans have over their actions, it becomes apparent 
that the idea of moral luck is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because although 
Nagel’s intuition is that the absence of control rules out people being held 
morally responsible for most things, a man’s moral standing will always 
come down to the lucky or unlucky nature of external in&uences that are 
beyond his control. Nagel suggests that although the absence of control seems 
to eliminate moral responsibility, society can still assess people as morally 
good or bad, as long as we accept that moral luck is a paradox. If society 
were to excuse everyone’s actions as being the product of a lack of control, 
we would be unable to hold anyone morally responsible, which would be a 
major dilemma for society. 
Nagel describes four kinds of luck that can in&uence our moral standing 
in society. #e $rst kind of luck that Nagel discusses is “luck in the way 
one’s actions and projects turn out,” which is also commonly referred to 
resultant luck.3 As stated in Nagel’s example, a drunk driver can be said to 
have received moral good luck if he swerves onto a sidewalk and there are 
no pedestrians. If there had been pedestrians on the sidewalk and he had 
killed them, we would view this man as morally worse than a drunk driver 
who simply crashed his car. #e driver has no control over whether or not 
2  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 751.
3  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752.
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there are pedestrians present, so the vehicular manslaughter would be con-
sidered a case of bad moral luck for the man. Nagel also demonstrates luck 
in the way one’s actions turn out by considering cases where decisions are 
made under uncertainty. For example, a rebel leader waging war against the 
government could not be morally assessed until we observed the results of 
his battle. If many of his people died and su"ered, which is a consequence 
determined by uncontrollable luck, than we would assess him as morally 
bad. Nagel states that how things turn out tends to “in&uence culpability or 
esteem in a large class of unquestionably ethical cases ranging from negligence 
through political choice.”4
#e second kind of luck is constitutive luck, which Nagel describes as “luck 
in the kind of person you are,” and luck in “your inclinations, capacities, 
and temperaments.”5 Nagel states that our personal characteristics, such as 
being envious or conceited, are subject to moral condemnation even if these 
characteristics are “beyond the control of the will.”6 In other words, even if 
we are sincerely motivated to control these impulses and cannot, people are 
often nevertheless morally “assessed for what they are like.”7 While we can 
control our own will, we cannot control these traits and personal character-
istics. Next, Nagel describes what he calls circumstantial luck. He describes 
this luck by stating that “things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we 
face, are importantly determined by factors beyond our control.”8 For exam-
ple, citizens of Germany who joined Hitler’s regime during the Holocaust 
are judged as morally bad. Citizens of the United States may have joined 
the regime if they were in similar circumstances, but we do not morally 
judge them because they never had to make the choice, which is a matter of 
circumstantial luck. Lastly, Nagel describes “luck in how one is determined 
by antecedent circumstances.”9 Everything about what we do and who we 
are is determined by previous events and circumstances. Nagel points out 
that this fact theoretically makes it impossible to hold people responsible, 
4  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 753.
5  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752.
6  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 755.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid.
9  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752. 
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even for our evil motives and intentions, because who we are is dependent 
on previous circumstances that we have no control over. Nagel points out 
that this aspect of moral luck threatens to undermine all moral judgment, 
and this is why the concept of moral luck seems to make it di!cult to hold 
people responsible. 
Nagel states that the responsible self will disappear if all that is focused 
on is factors that are not in one’s control. However, Nagel states that since 
humans cannot take an external view of themselves, we end up judging people 
as morally good or bad anyway, just as we would ourselves. Since focusing 
on the absence of control would alleviate all of human moral responsibility, 
we cannot operate from this view. Nagel introduces a complex philosophical 
problem for which he provides no solution. While stating that the human 
race often bases moral responsibility on factors that we have no control over, 
he seems to simultaneously conclude that our current legal system is unjust. 
While Nagel’s essay examines the problematic paradox of moral luck, David 
Lewis provides an argument that aims to rationalize our legal system’s way 
of punishing criminal attempts, while also acknowledging the existence of 
resultant luck. 
David Lewis aims to articulate the nature of our current legal system with-
out making it sound as if it is contradictory to the principle of proportional 
punishment, which states that the severity of a criminal’s sentence should 
be in proportion to what he deserves. While Lewis concedes that it is un-
just to punish failed attempts less severely than successful attempts, as both 
deserve equal punishment for their equally dangerous conduct, he suggests 
that the only way we can rationalize our current system is by making a case 
that we are punishing successful and failed attempts equally. Speci$cally, 
Lewis’ essay is concerned with our judicial system’s unequal punishment of 
murder and attempted murder. Lewis aims to justify our judicial system by 
suggesting that criminals metaphorically subject themselves to a penal lottery 
every time they attempt to murder their victims, and although whether or 
not the victim dies is a matter of resultant luck, our judicial system may be 
punishing all attempts equally because it is the criminal who has voluntarily 
subjected himself to varying levels of punishment.
Before Lewis explains his unique way of rationalizing punishment, he 
objects to a few other arguments that aim to accomplish the same goal. One 
rationale that Lewis addresses is that a criminal who successfully completes 
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a crime deserves a more severe punishment simply because he is unlucky, 
which is an idea that invokes the debate of moral luck. In other words, while 
admitting that the di"erence between successful and failed attempts often 
comes down to luck in the way things turn out, this rationale insists that 
our justice system can cite luck as it’s reasoning for di"erential punishment. 
Lewis states that resultant luck cannot be the factor that justi$es di"eren-
tial treatment of successful and failed attempts, as we have no control over 
anything that occurs beyond the moment of our actions. Lewis insists that 
the luck involved in how our actions turn out has no bearing on how “the 
lucky and unlucky are,” and makes no di"erence to “how they act.”10 While 
Nagel suggests that the nature of our personality and the actions that we 
perform are matters of constitutive and circumstantial luck, Lewis states 
that we have control over who we are and how we act, and it is justi$able 
to punish someone accordingly. As this rationale cites luck as the primary 
reason for di"erential punishment, Lewis aims to $nd a rationale that can 
better justify our unequal punishment of attempts.
Another rationale that Lewis addresses insists that it is justi$able to punish 
successful attempts more severely because they require stronger whole-heart-
edness, as whole-hearted attempts require “stronger wicked desires,” and 
subject the victim to greater risk because they are more likely to succeed.11 
Lewis objects to this rationale because he does not believe that success can 
be the only measure of whole-heartedness, although he states that it is just 
to punish whole-hearted attempts more severely and to “proportion the 
punishment to the heartedness of the attempt.”12 Lewis associates hearted-
ness with the amount of risk that is in&icted on the victim of a crime. Lewis 
proposes a new rationale that he deems comparable to our present judicial 
system, in which successful attempts are punished more severely. He admits 
that it is most likely not just, but that it makes “at least a prima facie case” 
that our system is just.13
 Lewis states that our current legal system can be compared to a “disguised 
10  Lewis, David. “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” Philosophy & Public 
A"airs 18.1 (1989): 56, accessed May, 2015, JSTOR. 
11  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 56.
12  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 57.
13  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 58.
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form of a penal lottery.”14 A penal lottery is a hypothetical form of judicial 
process in which every man who attempts a crime is brought to court and 
subsequently “subjected to a risk of punitive harm.”15 In this system, the court 
must decide if the defendant has knowingly and wrongfully subjected his 
victim to a risk of death. If the court $nds that this is the case, the defendant 
is found guilty and is subjected to a lottery. After a guilty verdict, the court 
must determine how much risk the victim has been subjected to (a measure 
of heartedness), and the defendant’s chances of winning the lottery are 
proportioned to the amount of risk he has in&icted on his victim. Whether 
or not the criminal is successful in his attempt, he will be sentenced to a 
lottery that leaves his punishment to chance. In this way, the lottery punishes 
successful attempts and failed attempts equally, because both criminals are 
sentenced to the same lottery. 
Lewis insists that our current judicial system can be best characterized as an 
“impure” penal lottery, in which there is a guarantee of certain harm for both 
winners and losers. #e winners of this lottery get a short prison sentence, 
while the losers are sentenced to death. In this system of punishment, it is 
known at once whether or not the defendant will win or lose if he is found 
guilty and sentenced to the lottery. #e reason that the result of the lottery 
is immediately known is because the actual crime that has occurred serves as 
it’s own way of determining the result. If the victim dies, the criminal will 
be sentenced to death. If the victim lives, the criminal will receive a short 
prison sentence. #erefore, the crime of attempted murder can be thought 
of as a penal lottery because whether or not the victim dies is a matter of 
chance. Since both successful and unsuccessful criminals face the prospect 
of punitive punishment, and both have subjected themselves to the same 
lottery, a case can be made that we are punishing them equally. #e fact that 
we punish failed crimes less severely than completed crimes does not mean 
that an unsuccessful criminal should be described as less guilty, it just means 
that he has been fortunate in his resultant luck. Criminals subject themselves 
to a disguised form of a penal lottery every time they take the chance of 
in&icting varying levels of harm to their victims. Although the death of the 
victim is a matter of chance, the defendant is the one who has voluntarily 
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid.
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subjected the victim to this risk of death. Lewis’ argument is that our current 
judicial system may be punishing attempts equally, as the criminal’s chance 
of receiving severe punishment is proportional to the chance that he has 
taken while in&icting a risk of death upon his victim.
Although he presents an argument that aims to justify our current system 
of punishment, Lewis admits that he is on the fence about whether or not 
this aspect of our legal system is just. Sanford H. Kadish o"ers an argument 
that is far more opposed to unequal punishment for failed and successful 
criminal attempts. 
Kadish’s essay revolves around its criticism of the role that resultant luck 
plays in our punishment of criminal attempts. Kadish states that our current 
judicial system is in accord with the “harm doctrine,” which is a doctrine 
that “reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers if by chance the harm 
they intended or risked doesn’t occur.”16 Kadish acknowledges that humanity 
consistently factors in this resultant luck when we morally judge people and 
their actions, and that criminal law is essentially a re&ection of humanity’s 
moral viewpoints. Nevertheless, he states that the harm doctrine cannot be 
rationally defended, although “its adoption by the law” is rational because 
humanity’s moral judgments are irrational.17 Although this essay acknowl-
edges the paradox of moral luck, it is far more concerned with why the harm 
doctrine is not rationally defensible in terms of its application to criminal 
law. Kadish states that the harm doctrine is not rationally supportable be-
cause it “does not serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law,” 
and because it cannot be supported by the any relevant principle of justice, 
as punishment’s moral function is to sentence criminals based on what they 
deserve, and resultant luck has no in&uence on desert.18
Kadish argues that governing in accordance with the harm doctrine does 
not facilitate crime prevention because the doctrine does not aid in “prevent-
ing further acts by the o"ender” or “discouraging criminal acts by others.”19 
16  Kadish, Sanford H. “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” !e Journal of Crim-
inal Law & Criminology 84.4 (1994): 679, accessed May, 2015, Academic Search Premier 
[EBSCO].
17  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 681.
18  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 680.
19  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 684.
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To begin his argument, Kadish articulates why he believes punishing failed 
attempts less severely does not help prevent further acts by the criminal. 
Kadish argues that in cases where the criminal has intentionally attempted to 
commit a crime, the actual occurrence of a harm is not relevant in assessing 
the criminal’s dangerousness to society, and that punishment is supposed 
to be a “response to the threat” that criminals impose on society.20 Kadish 
exempli$es this argument by considering a case in which a man who is a 
given a short prison sentence for attempted murder has his sentence reversed 
to life in prison, simply based on the fact that the victim happened to die 
months later. #e dangerousness of the man has been shown by his attempt 
to kill his victim, and the victim’s death should not impact the man’s prison 
sentence because it is a factor beyond his control. Kadish also states that 
resulting harm should have no bearing on criminal sentencing in cases of 
culpable risk creation. For example, a man who kills a person while playing 
Russian roulette is equally as dangerous as a man who, by luck, does not end 
up killing his victim. Kadish suggests that this is logic also applies to cases 
of impossibility, because the defendant’s dangerousness to society has been 
exempli$ed despite the fact that a crime could not have possibly occurred. 
Continuing his argument, Kadish addresses his statement that the harm 
doctrine does not aid in discouraging others from committing criminal acts. 
To develop his argument, Kadish deconstructs two possible arguments that 
suggest lesser punishment for failed attempts would actually aid in the general 
deterrence of crime. #e $rst argument states that by punishing attempts less 
severely than completed crimes, “we do not lose deterrence, because people 
who try to commit a crime expect to succeed, and if the punishment for 
success does not deter them, an equal punishment for failure certainly will 
not.”21 Kadish objects to this theory by arguing that in cases where a criminal 
knows there is a better chance of being caught and punished if he fails, as 
is the case during consensual narcotic sales, equally severe punishment for 
attempts would more e"ectively deter crime. #e second possible argument 
states that “the harm doctrine would serve crime preventative purposes by 
o"ering the prospect of lesser punishment as an inducement for the defendant 
20  Ibid.
21  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 686.
paideia
132
to desist.”22 In response, Kadish states that this argument cannot be applied 
to cases of culpable risk creation, as it is too late to desist from an action 
once a risk is taken. Furthermore, Kadish states that in cases of attempt, this 
argument does not apply to criminals who believe that they have taken the 
last step towards completing a harm. Even for criminals who believe they 
have more to do, Kadish states that a change of heart is unlikely once they 
have committed themselves to a “substantial act towards carrying out the 
crime,” a condition that is required in the law of attempts.23
As previously stated, the second element to Kadish’s reasoning on why 
the harm doctrine is not rationally defensible is that it cannot be defended 
by a relevant principle of justice. Kadish suggests that the “principle of des-
ert,” which insists that punishment should be limited to “what the o"ender 
deserves,” is not in accord with the harm doctrine.24 His reasoning is that 
criminals deserve to be punished based on the nature of their wrongful acts, 
and the resulting harm from a criminal act has no relevance to what the 
criminal deserves. Kadish raises a few possible arguments that attempt to 
justify the lesser punishment of failed attempts in terms of what the criminal 
deserves. #e $rst argument that Kadish addresses is Lewis’ concept of a penal 
lottery, which insists that a criminal deserves to be evaluated and punished 
based on what he has caused because he is the one who has voluntarily sub-
jected his victim to a risk of death. Kadish rejects this concept because he 
cannot fathom how, in cases of an attempted killing, it is justi$able to leave 
the sentences of two equally deserving o"enders to the chance of whether 
or not the victim dies or lives. #e second argument that Kadish addresses 
suggests that one who succeeds at causing harm makes him a worse person. 
In response to this commonly held suggestion, Kadish states that the prin-
ciple of proportional punishment requires that the severity of punishment 
should be proportional to the defendant’s blameworthiness, not what he 
has “become in some existential sense,” as the argument suggests.25 In other 
words, the blameworthiness of a defendant should be determined strictly 
based on the nature of his action. Lastly, Kadish addresses the retributive 
22  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 687.
23  Ibid.
24  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 688.
25  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 692.
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justi$cation of punishment that views punishment as restoring a loss that 
has been bestowed upon the victim and the victim’s family. Kadish argues 
that punishing a criminal does not restore anything at all, and the concept 
of restoration does not have any relation to the amount of punishment that 
a criminal should receive. 
Since irrational laws that are in accordance with the harm doctrine are 
re&ective of our intuitive moral judgments, Kadish insists that changing 
these laws would be risky, as it would essentially cast doubt upon humanity’s 
ability to assess what is right or wrong. Kadish sums up our irrational system 
of punishment with a quote from Isaiah Berlin, which states that “out of the 
crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.”26
So far, we have been introduced to Lewis’ argument, which aims to ra-
tionalize our lesser punishment of attempts while maintaining that it may 
not be just, and Kadish’s argument, which completely objects to our system 
of punishment due to the role that resultant luck plays in the causation of 
harm. In contrast, Michael S. Moore argues that it is justi$able to punish 
failed attempts less severely than completed crimes, because the criminal 
who succeeds at a crime is more morally blameworthy than one who fails. In 
this view, our current system is in accord with the principle of proportional 
punishment and the principle of desert. 
In his essay on the role that harm plays in our assessment of moral blame-
worthiness, Michael S. Moore argues that successful attempts are more 
morally blameworthy than failed attempts. Before articulating this view, 
Moore aims to show that we have more control over the harm that we cause 
than Nagel’s theory of resultant luck gives us credit for. Moore suggests that 
a resulting harm is not a matter of luck, and that we not only have control 
over our circumstances and the choices that we make, but also the harm 
that results from our choices. After deconstructing Nagel’s control principle 
and the idea of resultant luck, Moore argues that harm plays a crucial role 
in moral blameworthiness because a criminal who in&icts harm will have 
a much stronger sense of moral guilt than a criminal who does not in&ict 
a harm, and this harsher sense of guilt correctly translates to a more severe 
verdict during criminal sentencing. 
Moore starts with his deconstruction of resultant luck, suggesting that 
26  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 702.
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the term “luck” is not a proper representative of the true moral issue that 
is at stake regarding the debate on whether or not the causation of harm is 
relevant to moral blameworthiness.  #is is because our common use of the 
word luck is at odds with the way that Nagel uses the term when describing 
the causation of harm. For example, our society would describe a shooter as 
being lucky if his bullet hits his intended target, and Nagel would incorrectly 
deem this shooter as being unlucky due to his increased moral blamewor-
thiness. Moore suggests that the “issue is better cast straightforwardly in 
terms of causation.”27 In other words, we should only be concerned with 
identifying the factors that are involved with the causation harm, such as the 
criminal’s control over his actions and the subsequent result of his actions. 
In Moore’s view, none of these factors involve anything we would commonly 
think of as luck.
After deeming luck as an irrelevant factor in the causation of harm, Moore 
addresses the common argument that we are only responsible for our actions, 
and that the resulting harm that occurs from these actions is beyond our 
control. Moore exempli$es that there is a serious problem with this notion 
by pointing out that the two premises of this argument are contradictory. 
#e $rst premise to this argument uses a “compatibilist sense of control,” 
which suggests that “we do not need to control every factor making a result 
possible; we only need a reasonable chance to have avoided the result.”28 In 
other words, this premise suggests that we have control over the results of 
our actions whenever we control the chances of bringing them about. Under 
this premise, it would seem that a shooter should be held responsible for 
the death of his victim because he is in control of the risk he is presenting 
to his victim. #e second premise, as Moore states, uses an “incompatibilist 
sense of control,” which suggests that “we control some result only when 
we can make causally e!cacious choices about every factor that could cause 
or prevent this result.”29 In this sense of control, we are not even in control 
of our choices or intentions because we are not in control of every factor 
27  Moore, Michael S. “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” Causation and Responsibility: 
An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. By Michael S. Moore. N.p.: (Oup Oxford, 2015), 
23. 
28  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 25.
29  Ibid.
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that leads to them, such as our genetic make-up. #e incompatibilist sense 
of control seems to correlate with Nagel’s instances of constitutive, circum-
stantial, and antecedent luck, as it deems almost every aspect of who we 
are and how we act as being beyond our control. Moore immediately rules 
out this incompatibilist sense of control, as he states that we most certainly 
have control over our choices, intentions, and actions. Moore is concerned 
with whether or not it is possible to argue that in a compatibilist sense of 
control, we are in control of our intentions and actions, but not the results 
of our actions. 
Moore points out that three philosophers by the names of Morse, Ferzan, 
and Alexander argue that even in the compatibilist sense of control, we are 
in control of our choices, intentions, and actions, but not their subsequent 
result. #eir argument is that since “the only form of control a responsible 
actor needs is the general capacity to be guided by reason…compatibilists 
have good reason to draw the line at human action because only action can 
be guided by reason.”30 Moore cannot wrap his head around this logic, and 
he exempli$es his counter-argument by introducing a situation where a 
man puts a gun to his victim’s head, pulls the trigger, and kills him. Moore 
states that since the man has control over the choice to kill his victim, and 
this choice is guided by reason, he must also have control over the choice’s 
intended e"ect of murdering his victim, because the act of shooting was 
guided by reason. For Moore, the suggestion that we only control what we 
directly cause is “too narrow a notion of control.”31 
It is obvious that not every criminal act is one in which the criminal has 
complete control over every possible factor that could interfere with the 
outcome. As Moore points out, many philosophers conclude that there are 
di"erent degrees of control that we can have over the “real-world e"ects” of 
our choices.32 In other words, we can’t always predict the result of an intended 
action, no matter how likely it may seem to occur. Moore states that this 
notion of unpredictability is irrelevant because, as he has stated previously, 
our causation of harm is guided by our reasoning, thereby making us fully 
in control of the harm that we have caused.
30  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 27.
31  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 28.
32  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 29.
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#us-far, Moore has simply deconstructed the common reformist notion 
that we are not in control of the harm that our actions have caused, and 
has stated that it is certainly not a matter of moral luck. However, Moore’s 
rebuttal fails to state anything regarding why a criminal who causes a harm is 
more morally blameworthy than one who fails at an attempt to cause harm. 
Moore’s argument regarding moral blameworthiness suggests that criminals 
who in&ict harm upon their victims are more blameworthy because they 
are likely to feel a stronger sense of guilt than criminals who fail to cause 
harm. Moore states that when we fail to in&ict a harm that we have either 
tried to cause or have unreasonably risked, our feeling of guilt is likely to 
be self-focused, and will most likely be combined with a sense of relief that 
a harm did not occur. When we cause a harm, we are likely to feel severe 
guilt that is not only self focused, but also focused on the su"ering of the 
person that we have harmed. Moore concludes that when we cause harm, 
“the reason we feel so guilty… is we are so guilty.”33 Although Moore admits 
that some may condemn the fact that he is basing a moral argument around 
personal feelings, he says he “cannot see how to do moral philosophy if one 
puts aside the emotions.”34 
Moore completely objects to the notion that we do not have control over 
the harm that we cause, and insists that the harm that we cause has a sub-
stantial e"ect on our moral blameworthiness. In sharp contrast, Joel Feinberg 
views harm as a matter of resultant luck, and his essay aims to provide a new 
way that our penal code could go about articulating criminal behavior so 
that the caused harm is completely left out.
 In his essay “equal punishment for failed attempts,” Feinberg takes what 
he classi$es as a “reformist” position on how to treat successful and failed 
attempts of murder. #e reformist position proposes a new way that our 
criminal justice system should treat crimes of murder and attempted mur-
der, whereas a “retentionist” philosopher such as Moore would argue that 
our current system of punishment should remain. Essentially, the reformist 
position demands equal punishment for failed and successful attempts, 
insisting that moral blameworthiness is not in&uenced by the actual harm 
caused, as the harm caused is often a matter of resultant luck. #is equal 
33  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 30.
34  Ibid.
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punishment would deem our legal system as being in accordance with the 
principle of proportional punishment, as this principle insists that the se-
verity of punishment should be proportional to the moral blameworthiness 
of the criminal act. Feinberg states that punishing defendants based on their 
resultant luck brings arbitrariness into our legal system, and that “arbitrariness 
is to a legal system what corrosive rust is to machinery.”35 Resultant luck 
is arbitrary because it is too general of a concept to accurately explain why 
we punish successful and failed attempts di"erently. By objecting to some 
popular retentionist arguments, Feinberg demonstrates his position that 
the equal punishment of both failed and successful attempts would rid our 
legal system of arbitrariness, and that this reformist position would correctly 
adhere to the principle of proportional punishment.
Feinberg begins his essay by proposing that we reform the wording of our penal 
code by eliminating the causal condition in the de$nition of completed crimes. 
For example, the crime of killing would instead be de$ned as “wrongful homicidal 
behavior,” and the penal code would contain no clause that requires the “victim to 
actually die.”36 Feinberg states that our penal code should be worded to insist that 
“any act of killing or attempted killing or the faulty or the faulty or blameworthy 
creating of an unreasonable risk of killing, whether or not the actor was aware of 
that risk, is an act of wrongful homicidal behavior.”37 #is de$nition is meant to 
leave out the causal condition of the actual harm and adhere strictly to the actus 
reus and mens rea elements involved in the act. Since blameworthiness is composed 
of many factors, the draftsmen of this hypothetical penal code could di"erentiate 
between $rst and second-degree wrongful homicidal behavior by assessing factors 
such as the criminal’s intentions and the circumstantial conditions surrounding 
the crime. In this system, the causal condition of harm would have no a"ect on 
criminal sentencing, as the severity of the sentence would be assessed by factors 
that are relevant to deciding the criminal’s actual blameworthiness. 
After articulating his reformist proposal, Feinberg introduces and subse-
quently refutes a few common retentionist arguments. #e $rst argument 
35  Feinberg, Joel. “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Argu-
ments Against It.” Arizona Law Review 37.1 (1995): 118, accessed May, 2015, LexisNexis 
Academic [LexisNexis]. 
36  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 119.
37  Ibid.
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comes from the liberalist perspective that acts should only be punished if 
they cause harm to other people, as it is not the government’s business to 
regulate acts that they simply disapprove of. Feinberg states that this argu-
ment is obviously inapplicable to the crime of attempted murder, because 
the dangerousness of the criminal needs to be accounted for even if no harm 
is caused. #e second argument that Feinberg refutes insists that a murderer 
is more blameworthy than a man who fails at attempting murder because he 
has caused more harm, therefore his punishment should be proportional to 
the amount of harm he has caused. Feinberg suggests that this argument is 
ill-advised because it views criminal law as being similar to tort law, which is a 
system of law that requires criminals to pay reparations that are proportional 
to the amount of damage they have in&icted on the victim. Feinberg insists 
that the purpose of criminal law is to punish defendants based on what they 
deserve, and to discourage society from performing dangerous conduct.
Lastly, Feinberg addresses “the argument from moral emotions,” which sug-
gests that a criminal o"ender who fails to in&ict harm on another person is 
likely to feel far less guilty than an o"ender who causes harm, therefore making 
the successful o"ender more guilty in terms of criminal law.38 #is argument, 
which is the basis of Moore’s argument, suggests that a man who merely attempts 
murder but does not succeed would likely feel a sense of shame, as opposed to 
guilt. In response, Feinberg states that based on the way the English language 
uses the word guilt “even for acts and thoughts that are morally innocent in the 
judgment of others,” the criminal who fails at a crime would surely feel a strong 
sense of guilt due to the fact that his behavior has violated the basic moral values 
that society has engrained in him.39 If the man who misses his shot due to mere 
luck does not feel a strong sense of guilt, than there is something wrong with his 
psychological wiring. Feinberg states that one is unlikely to feel shame in this 
case, because shame is something that one feels when we embarrass ourselves 
in our own eyes. #erefore, as Feinberg states, Moore’s argument is irrational 
because a feeling of guilt is something that failed attempts can trigger just as 
easily as successful attempts. 
Feinberg concludes his argument by re-presenting his reformist position. 
He states that our penal code should be worded in a way that articulates 
38  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 126.
39  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 128.
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whether or not a criminal has acted purposely, negligently, knowingly, or 
recklessly toward a harmful result. After the court establishes these factors, 
which determines whether or not the act is wrongful homicidal behavior, 
the sentence can be adjusted based on the criminal’s moral blameworthiness. 
Blameworthiness is composed of factors such as the criminal’s motivations, 
his intentions, and the circumstances involved with the crime. For example, 
if a criminal premeditatedly shoots a woman for rejecting him, the criminal 
may receive a harsher sentence than a criminal who impulsively shoots a man 
during an argument. While the reformist position demands equal punishment 
for failed and successful attempts, this position also insists that the severity 
of punishment should be based on the blameworthiness of the o"ender. By 
demanding equality, Feinberg is simply demanding that resultant harm of 
a crime should not play a role in the punishment of crime. 
In response to Feinberg’s essay, Barbara Herman develops an argument that sug-
gests that there “might be good reasons to treat attempts separately.”40 Although 
she doesn’t de$ne herself as a retentionist, Herman’s argument o"ers a way of 
looking at criminal attempts that highlights factors other than moral blame-
worthiness, which is a perspective that makes the di"erential punishment of 
successful and failed attempts appear to be more rational than reformists such 
as Feinberg would like to believe.
Herman insists that in cases of failed criminal attempts, “we are sometimes 
unsure that the causal explanation for the failure is an external interven-
tion.”41 #is statement alludes to Moore’s theory that we have a certain 
degree of control over the results of our actions. Herman suggests that it 
is reasonable to believe that attempts may fail for many reasons, such as 
“a partial with-holding of will, an ambivalence of motive,” and “a lack of 
whole-hearted dedication to the goal.”42 While giving a vote of con$dence 
to human-agency, Herman also insists that although what occurs beyond our 
moment of action is often beyond our control to some degree, “whether or 
not the world cooperates in our e"orts…is not a matter of luck.”43 Herman 
40  Herman, Barbara. “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” Arizona Law Review 37.1 
(1995): 143, accessed May, 2015, LexisNexis Academic [LexisNexis].
41  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 144.
42  Ibid.
43  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 147.
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is suggesting that the ability of our world to interfere with the success of our 
actions is something that every rational human being is aware of prior to 
committing a criminal act. As it is reasonable to believe that our actions will 
go as planned and not be interfered with, we are not lucky when our actions 
succeed. Herman insists that referring to the real world’s interference with our 
actions as luck deems luck as morally irrelevant. In Herman’s eyes, we are re-
ceptive of good or bad luck only when things occur that are not in accordance 
with we intend. #erefore, a criminal who tries to kills someone cannot state 
that he is either morally lucky or unlucky if he succeeds or fails, as the result 
of his action is simply a possible outcome of his action. While every criminal 
is equally likely to receive fortunate or unfortunate real-world e"ects during 
or after his act has been committed, Herman suggests that criminals cross a 
moral thresh-hold when they engage in dangerous behavior, and the causation 
of harm that this behavior brings about is imputable to them.
While Herman suggests that criminals should be held responsible for 
the harm that they cause, she does not dissect the notion that harm has an 
e"ect on moral blameworthiness. She is simply trying to show that it may 
be a good idea to place unsuccessful criminal attempts in a separate category 
because criminals are responsible for the harm that they cause, and harm 
is not a case of resultant luck. Herman also suggests that some criminal 
attempts are, by nature, di"erent than the commonly used hypothetical 
scenario where a criminal shoots his intended victim. For example, in cases 
of rape, penetration must occur in order there to be any kind of rape. In 
shooting cases, a criminal can be said to have attempted murder whenever 
he pulls the trigger, whereas it is di!cult to distinguish what would clas-
sify as an attempted rape. Herman states that in cases such as attempted 
rape, “we may want to preserve the distinctness of the attempt…to mark 
our conviction that we deeply care about the di"erence between rape and 
attempted rape…”44 Herman also insists that there is often a wide range of 
possible reasons for failure in cases of attempt, and it most likely wise that 
our legal system accounts for this range of possible failure. Some cases of 
attempt require multiple stages of action, and not all cases involve a temporal 
action such as shooting a gun. 
While the common topic of discussion regarding attempts is often revolved 
44  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 146.
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around whether or not the causation of harm has any in&uence on moral 
blameworthiness, Herman’s argument suggests that we may want to take a 
deeper look at the di"erent factors involved with attempts. One factor that 
Herman states needs an explanation is the element of control that a criminal 
has over the harm that he intends to cause. Herman insists that when it comes 
to “contributions to the success” of our actions, we often have much greater 
control over certain things outside of our bodies than we have over ourselves.45 
For example, when we are writing an essay, the computer we are using is generally 
more responsive to our goal of $nishing the essay than we are, as our own laziness 
can interfere with our goal. #is example is meant to demonstrate that in cases 
of attempted murder, the notion that the bullet hitting the victim is a matter 
of luck is irrational, as we have “a baseline sphere of e"ective agency” over our 
murder weapon.46 Furthermore, when criminal actions do not go as planned, 
one cannot say that luck plays a role in this because every criminal action is 
equally likely to be interfered with by a multitude of possible mishaps. In the 
case of a man who is carefully and legally driving his car down the street, if an 
inadvertent skydiver falls directly in the path of the man’s car and is killed, the 
driver of the car could make a case that he has been a recipient of moral bad 
luck, as his behavior has not been dangerous. 
Herman insists that since criminals who intend to commit crimes are re-
sponsible for the harm that they cause, a case can be made that it is justi$able 
to punish criminals who do not bear the responsibility of in&icting harm less 
severely. Herman states that when we engage in dangerous behavior, we cross 
a moral threshold and become eligible for punishment that is based on “what 
our actions have brought about.”47 Whether or not criminals are actually more 
morally blameworthy when they in&ict a harm is a philosophical question that 
Herman does not address. 
It is apparent that the two main controversial issues that surround the 
concept of successful and failed attempts involve the amount of control we have 
over what our actions produce, and whether or not the causation of harm in&icts 
a greater amount of moral blameworthiness on us. David Lewis aims to justify 
our unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts while admitting that 
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid.
47  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 147.
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the causation of harm is a matter of resultant luck, and also that the causation 
of harm has no e"ect on a criminal’s moral blameworthiness. Kadish suggest 
that our current system of punishment cannot be justi$ed because of these 
reasons, and the unequal punishment of attempts does not facilitate the deter-
rent purposes of criminal law. Moore and Herman seem to suggest that we 
have far more control over how our actions turn out than Nagel’s concept of 
resultant luck gives us credit for. #ey believe that there is a certain amount 
of human agency that plays a role in the causation of harm, and blaming 
everything that our actions produce on luck is not a rational line of thought. 
Moore seems to take the strongest retentionist position, as he believes that the 
causation of harm actually has a signi$cant e"ect on moral blameworthiness. 
Feinberg rejects Moore’s notion that we should decide moral blameworthi-
ness based on the emotional feeling of guilt that a criminal may or may not 
feel after his crime. Furthermore, Feinberg is of the belief that we do not 
control what occurs beyond the moment of our actions, and our penal code 
should be worded to re&ect the signi$cant factors that contribute to moral 
blameworthiness, such as our motives and intentions. 
I cannot fathom how one can come to the conclusion that we are not in control 
of the harm that we cause. While there may be factors that either facilitate the 
intended outcome of an action or interfere with the intended outcome, I believe 
that Moore has taken the correct stance by insisting that since our actions are 
guided by reason, the intended outcome of an action is a matter of our reasoning, 
which we have full control over. However, this is not why I believe that successful 
criminal attempts should be punished more severely than failed attempts. #e 
deconstruction of the “lack of control” argument seems to only serve the purpose 
of falsifying the notion that successful criminals have been unfortunate in their 
resultant luck. However, one who takes this position could also argue that despite 
the fact that criminals are in full control of the harm that they cause, successful 
and failed criminal attempts should be punished equally because we should base 
our punishment on the morally heinous nature of the action itself. Feinberg has 
rejected the argument that criminals should be punished proportionally to the 
amount of harm that they cause, as this ideology should only apply only to tort 
law. Feinberg states that punishing a criminal does not restore anything, which I 
completely object to. 
In my opinion, we should completely ignore the concepts of control, luck, 
and moral blameworthiness when it comes to deciding the proper punishment 
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for a criminal. When we hand out a severe sentence to a criminal who has mur-
dered his victim, it is common to see the victim’s family crying and hugging in 
the courtroom, as if they are relieved that justice has $nally been served. We can 
dissect the philosophical nature of attempts all we want, but we cannot ignore 
the fact that the causation of harm has far greater consequences for the emotional 
stability of many people. When a mother loses a son, part of her has essentially 
been broken. How can we say that these factors should have no in&uence on what 
the defendant is deserving of? A man who attempts murder and fails will in all 
likelihood serve a substantial amount of time in prison, and we should trust that 
this sentence will deter him from ever trying to commit murder again. I also think 
it is irrational to say that unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts 
does not aid in the general deterrence of crime. When one commits a crime, his 
intention is to be successful at it! If the threat of a punishment that stems from a 
successful attempt does not deter the criminal, than nothing will. Furthermore, I 
believe that when we punish a man less severely for failing at an intended crime, 
we are justi$ed in doing so because he is deserving of the opportunity to repent 
for his actions, as his actions did not in&ict any harm to another person. When 
a victim dies, the criminal should serve a harsher punishment because he should 
not be a"orded the opportunity to repent for his crime, as his victim has not 
been a"orded the opportunity to live another day.
To conclude, I believe that the people who have constructed our criminal jus-
tice system are perfectly aware that both successful and failed criminal attempts 
are equally heinous. However, I believe that the draftsmen could not ignore the 
impact that harm has on many people, and they must’ve felt that it was their 
duty to re&ect the atrocity of harm and it’s emotional repercussions in criminal 
sentencing. In response to reformists who believe that criminals who fail at at-
tempts deserve equal punishment based on their equally dangerous and heinous 
actions, I would like to re-introduce a quote from Isaiah Berlin: “Out of the 
crooked timber of society, no straight thing was ever made.”48 
48  Kadish, Sanford H. “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” !e Journal of Crim-
inal Law & Criminology 84.4 (1994): 702, accessed May, 2015, Academic Search Premier 
[EBSCO].
